derecha|miniaturadeimagen|253x253px| Walther Stennes.
La Revuelta de Stennes o Putsch de Stennes fue una revuelta dentro del Partido Nacionalsocialista Obrero Alemán (NSDAP) en 1930-1931 dirigida por Walther Stennes, el comandante de Berlín de las Sturmabteilung (SA), "camisas pardas". La revuelta surgió de tensiones internas y conflictos dentro del partido de Alemania, particularmente entre la organización del partido con sede en Múnich y Adolf Hitler, por un lado, y las SA y su liderazgo por el otro.See generally Toland, pp. 248-52; Kershaw, pp. 347-51; Machtan, pp. 81-83; Read, pp. 199-211; Fest, pp. 281-82; Lemmons, pp. 81-82; and Grant, pp. 51-89 for general descriptions of the Stennes Revolt. Hay algunas pruebas de que Stennes pudo haber sido pagado por el gobierno socialdemócrata del canciller alemán Heinrich Brüning, con la intención de causar conflictos dentro del movimiento nacionalsocialista.Evans, Richard J. (2003) The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: Penguin Press. p.273.
Antecedentes El papel y el propósito de las SA dentro del nacionalsocialismo todavía estaba sin resolver en 1930.The SA was an "alien" body which had not been integrated into the party in 1930. Mommsen, p. 337. Hitler consideraba que las SA tenían fines estrictamente políticos, un cuerpo subordinado cuya función era fomentar la expansión y el desarrollo del ideal al poder. Las funciones propias de las SA, en opinión de Hitler, eran políticas, como proteger las reuniones del partido de la interrupción de los manifestantes, interrumpir las reuniones de los adversarios nacionalsocialistas, distribuir propaganda, reclutar, marchar en las calles para propagandizar mostrando apoyo a la causa nacionalsocialista, organizar campañas políticas, y pelearse con los comunistas en las calles. Hitler no abogaba por el funcionamiento de las SA como organización militar o paramilitar.See e.g. Toland, pp. 210-211 (April 1925 conflict between Hitler and Ernst Röhm over proper purpose of SA, leading to Röhm's resignation; p. 220 (Hitler's later selection of Pfeffer von Salomon as SA chief of staff to preside over a legitimate, non-military organization consistent with Hitler's announced "policy of legality" following the Beer Hall Putsch; and pp. 248-251 (tension between SA leaders seeking military function and Hitler's desire for strictly political function).
Muchos, en la propia SA, incluido el liderazgo, tenían una visión contraria y más gloriosa del papel de las SA. Para ellos, las SA era una organización militar naciente: la base para un futuro ejército ciudadano según el modelo napoleónico, un ejército que, idealmente, absorbería la Reichswehr y desplazaría sus conceptos prusianos pasados de moda con ideales nacionalsocialistas "modernos".Fischer, p. 85. Of course this was Röhm's view, both before his 1925 resignation from the party and after his return from South America at Hitler's request to lead the SA in 1931 -- a view which eventually led to his murder in The Night of the Long Knives.
Las elecciones de 1930
El llamado a elecciones Las elecciones al Reichstag tuvieron lugar en 1928 y las próximas elecciones estaban programadas para 1932.In the Reichstag election of May 1928, the Nazis had won just 12 seats out of a total of 491. As a consequence, they were only the ninth largest party in the Reichstag, and had less than one-fourth the seats held by the Communists, who made substantial gains in 1928 and who came to control 54 seats through the 1928 election. The parties of the Left (Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Communist Party (KPD)) were the main winners in 1928 and jointly controlled 226 seats as a result of the 1928 elections; if they could jointly muster a coalition of only 246 seats, the coalition would be a parliamentary majority. See 1928 election results.
The NSDAP's pitiful showing (less than 3% of the 1928 popular vote) "appeared to confirm the correctness of those commentators who for years had been preaching the end of Hitler and his Movement," Kershaw, p. 302. In the cities, the results were awful for the Nazis; in Berlin, the NSDAP received 1.57% of the vote. Kershaw, p. 303. Some within the party even came to believe that Hitler would be forced to repudiate his plan to obtain power strictly through legal means, instead of by putsch, and he authorized the Nazi press in June of 1928 to reaffirm his commitment to constitutional procedures as the path to power. Kershaw, p. 304.
Desafortunadamente para el curso de la democracia alemana, el gobierno de MüllerMueller, a Social Democrat, headed the so-called "Grand Coalition," which included members of the SPD (153 seats), German Democratic Party (25 seats), German People's Party (DVP, 45 seats), Catholic Center Party, (Zentrum, 61 seats) and Bavarian People's Party (17 seats). Any combination of 246 seats would create a majority. Kershaw, p. 304; Collier, p. 39. implosionó a fines de marzo de 1930 por la cuestión del monto de las contribuciones de los empleadores al seguro de desempleo.The coalition parties failed to cope with the issues raised by the Great Depression and by their mutual intransigence, and refusals to compromise, assisted the Weimar Republic in its suicide and facilitated the rise of the Nazis. Germany was strained by the obligation, enacted in 1927, to pay a fixed benefit to the unemployed. In 1927 with only 1.3 million unemployed in Germany, the procedure was quite workable; however, when unemployment rose with the depression, the Reich Institution responsible for benefit payment was forced to borrow from the general government, and the debt of some 350 million Reichsmarks by the end of 1929 strained the government's budget.The SPD wanted to increase the employer contribution from 3.5 to 4.0 percent; the DVP wanted instead to cut benefits; and the Center, trying to make peace, tried to negotiate a compromise wherein all parties would defer consideration of the issue until the autumn of 1930. The SPD refused the Center's proposed deal and the Mueller government was consequently stymied.
Mueller, faced with crisis, sought President Paul von Hindenburg's help, asking for power to rule by decree pursuant to Article 48 -- a power that had been granted in 1923 to Chancellor Gustav Stresemann by President Friedrich Ebert in economic crises and that would soon be granted by Hindenburg to each of Mueller's successors as Chancellor. The haughty, aristocratic and thoroughly anti-democratic Hindenburg, having no use for any Social Democrat, refused, having decided earlier to use the opportunity to oust the SPD from its position of power in the government; he relished the chance to have formed an anti-parliamentary and anti-Marxist government. Kershaw pp. 323-324. The result was, in accordance with Hindenburg's plan, the appointment of Heinrich Brüning, a Centrist, as Chancellor with no SPD members in his cabinet. Ibid; Collier p. 41.
Su sucesor, el gobierno de Bruening, no pudo obtener una mayoría parlamentaria para su propio proyecto de ley de reforma financiera, que fue rechazado por el Reichstag el 16 de julio de 1930.The Bruening program generally sought to cut government spending in a time of severe deflation and depression. Bruening le pidió a Hindenburg que invocara el Artículo 48 (Constitución de Weimar) para promulgar el proyecto de ley como un decreto de emergencia. Hindenburg lo hizo y el Reichstag rápidamente repudió el proyecto de ley el 18 de julio de 1930, invalidando así el decreto presidencial en virtud de la Constitución. Luego de esto, pidió a Hindenburg disolver el parlamento y convocar a nuevas elecciones, que estaban programadas para el 14 de septiembre de 1930.See Article 48 (Weimar Constitution) for references and detail.
Exigencias de las SA: agosto de 1930 Los miembros de las SA en Berlín,Machtan (pp. 182-183) notes that while Berlin was the major focus of discontent, similar incidents of dissatisfaction were percolating throughout the SA in Germany liderados por Stennes,Stennes had been a regular army officer in the Reichswehr, a police captain and a Freikorps leader as well as an arms racketeer. He was OSAF Stellvertreter Ost (Deputy Supreme SA Leader East) in the SA and one of Pfeffer's seven regional deputies. See Green, Hoffman, p. 15. Stennes had replaced Daluege in Berlin. Read, pp. 199-221. habían estado expresando objeciones a las políticas y propósitos de las SA, según lo definido por Hitler.Stennes had also been insubordinate: he had disobeyed directives and had formed ties with the German National People's Party (DNV) and the Stahlhelm. Grant also notes that the complaints from Stennes had been voiced since at least May 1930; the more explicit protest in August was thus no surprise, and it is characteristic of Hitler's penchant for procrastination and disorderliness that he did nothing for months. Grant. Estos miembros de las SA veían su organización como un grupo revolucionario, la vanguardia de un orden nacionalsocialista que derrocaría a la odiada República por la fuerza.
Stennes se quejó de que el avance dentro de las SA se basó incorrectamente en el amiguismo y el favoritismo más que en el mérito. Se opuso al enfoque general respetuoso de la leySome in the SA sarcastically referred to the Führer as "Adolf Legalité." que Adolf Hitler había adoptado después del Putsch de la cervecería, y a él y a sus hombres les irritó la orden hitleriana de terminar los ataques callejeros contra comunistas y judíos.Toland, p. 248. Las SA también querían tres lugares seguros en la lista del NSDAP para las próximas elecciones del Reichstag. Además, Stennes se quejó de que a los miembros de las SA bajo su mando no se les pagaba lo suficiente.The real problems were bossism and favoritism, and poor pay. They were peaved that the Political Organization lived in "luxury" while the SA men worked late until exhaustion. Fest p. 282. Stennes severely criticized Hitler for spending so much on the Brown House in Munich, while the SA men were underpaid. Grant, pp. 62-63. See also Machtan pp. 182-83 (while poor pay and the parliament seats were the ostensible reasons offered by Stennes, the main objection was the emphasis by Hitler on the "legality" approach).
Laa SA habían desarrollado una lista de siete demandas.These included the issuance of strident denunciations of Catholicism and capitalism (hardly a propos just before an election in a country with a substantial Catholic population), an end to corruption and bureaucratization in the NSDAP, the removal of Gauleiter power over SA men, the administration of SA independent of party administration and a fixed appropriation from party funds to be earmarked for the SA. Grant, p. 63. El 7 de agosto de 1930, Joseph Goebbels, el Gauleiter (líder regional) de Berlín, se reunió con Stennes y otros oficiales de las SA en Berlín. Stennes exigió los tres espacios de votación y, de lo contrario, amenazó con una "revolución de palacio", alegando que renunciaría y se llevaría el 80% de las SA de Berlín (unos 15.000 hombres) con él.Read, p. 199